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Abstract – Form follows function. But form does not follow from function. It is not 
derivable from the latter. For realizing a desired technical function, first of all a form 
needs to be found that is able to realize it at all. Secondly the question arises whether 
an envisaged form realizes the function in a good way. Functions are multiply 
realizable – various different forms can bear the very same function. One needs to 
find a form of a technical artifact that realizes an envisaged function sufficiently 
efficient, robust, or whatever criteria might be imposed. This paper scrutinizes into 
biomimetics as one way to find a good solution to the realization problem. Drawing 
on an approach from the philosophy of simulations, it reconstructs the biomimetic 
relation as being mediated by a theoretical model. It is shown that robustness of the 
functioning system is usually reached in different ways in biological and in 
technological systems, which explains differences in morphogenetic mechanisms or 
principles found these fields. This reconstruction helps understanding problems with 
robustness in synthetic biology that occur when technical design principles are 
implemented in a biological system. The mimetic relation between the biological and 
the technical realm turns out to be asymmetric. 
Keywords: Biological Function; Evolution; iGEM; Morphogenesis; Robustness; 
Simulation; Systems Biology; Technical Function. 
1. Introduction 
Form does not follow from function. It is therefore not a trivial task to find a form 
that realizes a desired technical function. “Form” in the wide sense as it is used here 
is not restricted to morphology and geometric properties, but including all kinds of 
structural relations, be they static or dynamic. In this sense, the architecture of a gene 




count as structure, as do the architecture of a computer program and the reaction 
network of a chemical oscillator. “Function” on the other hand, is either the capacity 
realized by this structure or form, or the contribution of a component of the structure 
to higher capacities, in the field of biology often the contribution to keeping the 
integrity of the organism or more generally to its living. For the present purpose, this 
informal, intuitive characterization of the highly disputed concept should suffice.1  
Realizations of a large number of technically interesting functions can be found in 
living nature, from lightweight structural elements via self-cleaning surfaces to 
strategies and control of locomotion on land, in water and in air. Biomimetics takes 
such biotic realizations of functions as antetypes for their technical realization and 
thus counts on living nature in finding solutions to the realization problem.  
The aim of my paper is to better understand the epistemology of biomimetics. In 
following this aim, I first reconstruct the process of copying a biological function as 
being mediated by an abstract model that links the biological and the technical 
system (sec. 1). Next, I reflect on the sources of robustness in biological and 
technical systems, respectively, in order to spot a major difference between what is 
sometimes called morphogenetic principles in biology on the one hand, and classical 
engineering strategies on the other (sec. 2). Next I discuss the prospects, and an 
example, of mimicking not only biological structures, which always are the results of 
evolution and development, but also those very mechanisms (sec. 3). Finally, I 
discuss an example from synthetic biology that exemplifies what I want to call the 
mimetic asymmetry: transferability between biological and technological systems is 
by and large a one-way system. Therefore, one better follows a biomimetic rather 
than a technological approach even when re-constructing gene regulatory networks 
for their technical use (sect. 4).  
2. Biomimetics: models bridging biology and technology 
Copying of a biological function is an indirect process of re-constructing functionally 
crucial properties (static and dynamic ones) of the underlying biological structure in 
a technical artifact so that the mimetically re-constructed structure can fulfill the 
desired function in the system it is embedded in. A lotus effect coating, e.g., copies 
                                                
1 For the extended philosophical debate on the concept of function see (Wouters 




elements of the surface structure of the lotus petals, but it serves its function only in 
an appropriate environment in which water dabbles the surface from time to time.  
The transfer from the biological to the technical realm is not only a constructive, but 
also an epistemic process. In order to be able to transfer the function, one needs to 
understand how the biological structure realizes the function (Nachtigall 2010). 
Uncovering “the general principles behind its functioning” (Vincent et al. 2006) is an 
important step in the transfer process. Biomimetics thus does not primarily aim at 
copying a biological structure, but at realizing a function. Copying – usually with 
major modifications – a biological structure is just a means to this end. It is a 
promising means because the biological system to be copied is itself a realization of 
the function. 
Similarity of the biological template, the donor system, and the technical device, the 
receiver system, would not sufficiently guide the transfer process. If a function is 
realized biologically by, say, a proteinaceous structure or a polysaccharide structure, 
it will not usually be helpful to find a chemical realization that is similar to these - 
often perishable - materials. In contrast, realizations might be based on metal parts, 
ceramic nanoparticles, or inorganic complexes. Scale might be different, as it is often 
the case in locomotive devices like wings or walking machines, energy supply might 
rely on completely different sources like batteries instead of metabolism, resulting in 
the need for completely different actuation systems, etc. In result, the technical 
system which is most similar to the biological one will usually not be the best 
technical implementation of the function – if it implements it at all. So another 
guideline than just structural similarity needs to guide the mimetic process, namely, 
as already quoted, an “understanding” of functioning or of its principles. 
“Understanding” in this context requires that a theoretic explanation is given of how 
the function is realized, or of why the structure is able to perform the function. One 
needed to find out that the lotus effect is a consequence of superhydrophobicity 
which is due to the microstructure of the surface of the lotus petal in order to be able 
to develop lotus effect surfaces (Barthlott & Ehler 1977, pp. 445-446; Solga 2007 et 
al.); that the flapping flight of many insects, birds and bats depends on high degrees 
of torsion of the wings before artificial insects could be constructed (Shyy 2016; 
Dickinson 2016; Chin 2016; Karásek 2018); that Gecko adhesion is brought about by 
short-ranged forces between the surface they stick onto and the minime soft 
branchings of the lamella of the Gecko foot, the spatulae, which nestle to the surface 
on the atomic scale (Bhushan 2016; Kroner & Arzt 2016). Such an explanation 
comes usually in form of a model of performing the function that specifies the 
contributions of all components and the ways how these contributions in combination 




locomotion, of protein-biosynthesis, of echolocation in bats, of the lotus effect and of 
Gecko adhesion. These models rather than simple similarity criteria inform and 
direct the technical implementation of the functions at stake.  
The principles of functioning of the donor system thus are depicted in an explanatory 
model. In functioning according to the same principles, the technical structure as the 
receiver system simulates the biological one. I therefore reconstruct biomimetic 
copying, or biomimesis, in terms of model based analog simulation (Krohs 2008): In 
an initial step, the biological realization of the function is modeled theoretically, i.e., 
understanding is gained of the structural means which realize the biological function: 
how the surface of the lotus flower repels dirt, how the bumblebee flies, etc. In the 
second step, the insights of this model are transferred to the technical realm: A 
technical structure is designed that satisfies the theoretical model by realizing the 
identified crucial structural elements – in a system that provides an appropriate 
context for fulfilling the desired function. 
On the coarse-grained level of description, the process of model-mediated 
biomimesis consists of four steps: 
1. Identification of a biological function or of a desired technical function in the 
biological realm 
2. Describing how this function is realized, i.e., constructing the model that explains 
the biological function. 
3. Envisaging an alternative, technically feasible realization. 
4. Realizing the function technically. 
Steps 2 and 3, often also 4, usually need to be reiterated before a satisfying result is 
obtained. It is also possible to further split the steps in smaller ones. However, a finer 
grained scheme would be valid for the particular case or for a certain class of cases 
onlx, so I do not include them in the general scheme. But even the coarse grained 
four-step-scheme is not obligatory. Research and development are fundamentally 
influenced by certain kinds of epistemic luck (Pritchard 2005), by path dependencies 
(Peacock 2009), by the order in which information is gained or retrieved, etc. This 
might lead not only to variation in the reiteration of steps, but even to skipping a 
step: It is epistemically possible that somebody is luckily envisaging a technical 
realization of a biological function without having an explicit model of this function. 
The status of the coarse grained scheme could thus best be regarded as a rational 




of biomimetic technology. It is certainly not the only possible reconstruction, but, as 
is shown below, one that helps understanding, and consequently also planning and 
steering, the process.  
I therefore strongly disagree with the judgment that the epistemological framework 
of biomimetics has only one part that can be fixed, namely “searching biological 
literature for functional analogies to implement” (Vincent et al. 2006). The central 
steps of the epistemic process do concern modeling rather than library work. They 
involve generation and re-application of the model of how the biological system 
implements the function. Literature search is a way to retrieve the model and is thus 
pragmatically often highly important. But this means only that one relies on model 
building that was done by others before and does not change the general epistemic 
process. It can also be done by others in an interdisciplinary. As Green et al. (2019) 
point out, biomimicry practitioners, typically engineers, physical scientists, 
chemistry and biological engineers, may often profit from direct interaction with 
those knowledgeable about the wealth of functions realized by biological traits, i.e., 
with biologists in natural history museums an collections. Certainly, other sources 
and cooperation partners from biology will as well be able to contribute also directly, 
not only via their publications being retrieved by the biomimeticists. The need for 
interdisciplinary co-operation can also be read from the four-step scheme given 
above. Step 1 relies on empirical description and research and is thus primarily a task 
for empirical biologists, step 2 on the application of – often formal – modeling 
techniques, done often by theoretical biologists. Steps 3 and 4 are demanding the 
core expertise of engineers and perhaps further co-operation with physicists, 
chemists, or biologists. 
3. Robustness in biological and in technical systems 
Biological systems persist under changing conditions, and they adjust to these 
conditions. They are stabile enough to resist thermodynamic, mechanical and other 
challenges. On the other hand, they must not be too stabile because this would 
prevent adjustments. Persisting by means of adjustment to changing conditions 
involves changes in structure and operation of the system. Maintained is not an exact 
form, but the organizational integrity and the self-regulatory processes as well as 
those linked to them. A system adjusting in such a way is called a robust system. 
“Robustness is the ability of a system to maintain its functionality across a wide 
range of operational conditions” (Hammerstein et al. 2006). This definition avoids 
reference to specifically biological criteria for robustness and thus takes into account 
that robustness does not only hold of biological, but often also of technical systems. 




biological organisms. This difference has important consequences for biomimetics. 
In order to discuss these, we need first to compare aspect or kinds of robustness in 
both sorts of entities. I am focusing only on aspects of particular importance for the 
epistemology of biomietics. 
Let us first look at biological organisms. They need to be robust in several respects. 
Since organisms are not very stabile in the classical sense – they can be wounded, 
poisoned, damaged by heat, etc. – they need repair mechanisms. Since many 
organisms feed on different sources, they also need mechanisms for switching their 
metabolism. And since challenges vary during the day and during the year, they need 
to follow this external rhythm and respond differently to the very same kind of 
stimulus at different times. In addition, we the environment challenges not only the 
fully developed organism, but also its development. So development needs itself to 
be robust and to lead to the same, or at least: to similar results, independently of 
deteriorations.  
Besides such external challenges, there are also internal ones: The genetic material is 
flexible and subject to mutations. So developmental pathways need to be robust with 
respect to mutations. This is achieved in part by a degenerated code, but more 
specifically by the structure of the gene regulatory networks that govern 
development. These networks provide redundant functionality and regulation 
mechanisms so that blocking or altering a node or link in the network by mutation 
usually does not affect its overall action.  
Robustness also holds for lineages on an evolutionary scale. Lineages remain stabile 
despite changing environments and despite evolutionary processes going on – in fact, 
they often remain stabile due to evolutionary processes. Robustness can be achieved 
by keeping variation even under selection so that future generations adapt quickly. 
So the fundamental mechanisms that make organisms robust are the following: 
a) Mechanisms of generation that lead in a robust way to a robust result; 
b) Mechanisms of maintenance, incl. replacement; 
c) Mechanisms of adjustment. 
For details and further mechanisms of robustness see Hammerstein et al. (2006). 
Specific accounts of overall robustness are given in the theory of autopoietic systems 
(Maturana & Varela 1980) and by Rosen’s (M,R)-systems (Rosen 1973; 1991; cf. 




This means that an organism is undergoing almost permanent modification. It adjusts 
to the environment as well as to internal modifications. It thus can be said that 
robustness in biological organisms is brought about by ongoing morphogenesis. 
Robustness in technology is usually achieved by different means. First of all, 
measures are often taken that reduce wear and tear of the artifact. This means that 
robustness in technology is much more based on stability and much less on a regular 
turnover of components, which turned out to be most important in the biological 
case. Another aspect of robustness in technical systems is a modular architecture that 
helps to maintain the system (besides its advantages in development and in 
construction). If and component becomes damaged, the damage is often isolated in 
the module it occurs in, so that no major problem occurs until this module can be 
replaced. Modularity in biology, in contrast, might often be less relevant for (self-
)maintenance of the system than for development and evolution. Moreover, modules 
e.g. of gene regulatory networks are usually much more interlinked and even 
overlapping and delineation of modules is often more an epistemically valuable 
constructive step rather than a neutral depiction of a complex network (Krohs 
2009b).  
So while biotic systems gain robustness through adaptive fluidity, technical systems 
are often robust because of stability, elasticity or stiffness, i.e., the ability to return to 
the previous state after deterioration. Before enquiring consequences of this 
difference, I am now looking at the prospects of transferring strategies for robustness 
from biology to the technical realm. 
4. Biomimetic approaches to morphogenesis 
If robustness is important for technical devices, including biomimetic ones, and if the 
biological processes of evolution and development lead to robust biological 
structures, it seems advisable to take advantage of the capacities of these biological 
processes and to include them in the biomimetic approach. Definitions or 
characterizations of biomimetics quite often include the idea of mimetic construction, 
in addition to mimetic structure and function. Copying synthetic pathways is 
sometimes even considered being on a par with copying structure and function: 
“biomimetics is the study of biological structures, their function, and their synthetic 
pathways, in order to stimulate and develop these ideas into synthetic systems similar 
to those found in biological systems.” (Sarikaya 1995, p.xi). It might nevertheless be 
useful to discern different levels of technical biomimesis. According to Borsari, the 
first level is copying biological structures in order to realize a function technically. 




mimicking complex strategies from nature, where fault tolerance in the brain by 
redundancy is mentioned as possibly providing a helpful model in electronics. The 
third level, then, is mimicking evolution (Borsari 2017).  
While Borsari’s first level includes mimicking not only structures, but also their 
involvement in processes, which might already be quite complex, his second level 
demands mimicking complex strategies. His example makes clear that this does not 
primarily refer to developmental processes, which also could be described as 
strategies to bring about the very same structure under a broad range of conditions, 
but rather to complex mechanisms in the fully developed biological entity that make 
it robust. The borderline between developmental robustness and robustness of 
developed entities by means of complex strategies might be fuzzy and even vanish 
under a certain perspective. For systematic reasons I nevertheless want to keep this 
distinction. Then, biomimetics of levels one and two mimicks evolved and developed 
biological features: level one is the mimicking of structures and their dynamics and 
thereby implementing a function; level two is mimicking complex strategies rather 
than mere processes. The difference, again, is a matter of degree, it is difficult to find 
a criterion for what a strategy is. What makes the difference is how it is modeled: A 
strategy might be best regarded as a complex, plastic process that is modeled as a 
problem solving strategy. With this distinction in mind, fault tolerance mechanisms 
in electronics, but also locomotion of artificial worms (Menciassi at al. 2004; 
Boxerbaum et al. 2012) and goal-finding behavior of vehicles (Braitenberg 1984) are 
examples of the second level of biomimetics, while the processes involved in self-
cleaning of lotus effect-surfaces and reversible adhesion of gecko pads remains on 
level one.  
Level three differs from the first two levels in focusing on the generation of form, not 
on the given form and the processes it is involved in. Level three deals literally with 
biomimetic approaches to morphogenesis. Borsari mentions evolution as the 
morphogenetic process to be mimicked, and this is what we find in the literature 
about technical mimicking of biological morphogenesis. Evolutionary strategies 
where propagated already in an early phase of the field of biomimetics (Rechenberg 
1973). Among the examples are the evolutionary way to shape a two-phase nozzle 
(Schwefel 1968), the evolution of neuronal networks as controllers of autonomous 
robots (Hülse et al. 2004), the directed evolution of proteins (Kan et al. 2016; Arnold 
2019), and the evolution of artificial cells (McCaskill 2009). As the examples show, 
we are often, but not always still dealing with systems close to biological ones when 
evolutionary strategies are at stake. Evolutionary strategies are also quite often 
applied in certain fields of applied mathematics and in programming. I will not 




symbolic content. Including this realm would demand opening up another debate. I 
confine my treatment of level three biomimetics to cases of concrete entities. Results 
can be transferred to the abstract case afterwards. 
Let me start with some general considerations. Systems realizing functions do not 
emerge from just mixing components. They need to be put together in a systematic 
way. In the biological realm, this seem to restrict possible outcomes, since these can 
only be results of developmental processes, and since the developmental processes 
can themselves only be results of evolutionary processes. So we can expect to find a 
nested path dependence constraining the outcomes. On the other hand, nature 
obviously found ways to come up with results on complicated paths that we would 
judge as extremely clever if found in technology, so restrictions might not be an issue 
in the long run.  
Biomimetic artifacts, on the other hand, are not usually build in a biomimetic way. 
Their construction follows technical paradigms rather than morphogenetic principles 
learned from biology. As it turns out, it is nevertheless valuable to look at such 
principles and consider the third level of biomimetics, the level of morphogenesis. 
Since biological morphogenesis includes not only phylogenetic, but also ontogenetic 
processes, my take of this level is wider than Borsari’s and includes both, evolution 
and development (Krohs 2021). This widening seems required because even one of 
the most intriguing examples of biomimetic evolution, the already mentioned 
evolutionary optimization of a two-phase nozzle (Schwefel 1968), combines 
evolutionary and developmental mechanisms. The nozzle with its initial taper in 
diameter was cut into sections so that the opening in each section had a different 
diameter. Sections were then put together in an arbitrary order, resulting in an 
irregular shape of the nozzle. Optimization then followed a scheme of variation of 
the order of the sections and selection according to measured efficiency. In the more 
efficient nozzle, two arbitrarily chosen segments exchanged against each other and 
again efficiency was measured. The better structure was chosen for further changes. 
This trial and error process of optimizing flow speed and efficiency lead to a nozzle 
with irregular shape that would hardly have been rationally constructed (Schwefel 
1968). Since technical morphogenesis was driven by an evolutionary paradigm taken 
from biology, the optimization is to be taken as biomimetics of level three. 
However, despite implementing variation and selection, this process of technical 
development is in important respects not an evolutionary process. With this caveat I 
do not refer to the fact that trial and error procedures do belong to the methodological 
spectrum of engineering anyway so that the distinction between a rational 




anyway (Morange 2013). At stake is instead that the engineering process, while 
taking up one aspect of evolution, namely variation and selection, realizes variation 
in a way highly different from what is found in evolution: not as variation between 
different individuals, but as varying again and again one and the same individual – 
which is much more resource efficient. Similar changes of the shape of an individual 
by rearrangements are known from biological development. In combination with 
growth processes, such change by rearrangement might even be considered the 
kernel of a developmental process. So the “evolution” of the nozzle crosses the line 
between evolution and development. But also the developmental metaphor would not 
be fully adequate for the case of the optimization of the nozzle. Biological 
development is usually taken to follow either a definite order of steps, or to lead, via 
regulation, to a predefined result. None of both seems to hold in our case. But the 
spectrum of developmental mechanisms is much broader. The shape of a tree is 
prefixed only to a degree that leaves open a wide range of options. Branches can be 
ordered in this or another way, as do leafs, as do roots. Interaction with the 
environment – with wind or with stones in the soil, e.g. – has a huge impact on the 
precise morphology or the tree. But also clear-cut changes of position occur. Cells 
migrate to their “destination” in the embryo, morphogenetic factors are spreading by 
diffusion, the differentiation of tissues is induded by another tissue that comes into 
contact with it due to growth of some third part of the embryo, etc. (Gilbert 2010). 
Though it is quite obvious that Schwefel’s experiments with the nozzle were inspired 
by evolution rather then by biological development, we can hardly tell it a clear-cut 
case of an evolutionary procedure.  
Fortunately, nothing depends on such a classification. The only reason why I insist in 
the different aspects of evolution and development in biological morphogenesis is 
that obviously the pool of morphogenetic mechanisms is much larger than only some 
trial-and-error aspect of evolution. Biomimetics of level three could draw not only on 
this single aspect, but on a wide spectrum of mechanisms. Many of them have 
evolutionary as well as developmental roots. Developmental mechanisms did 
themselves evolve, and evolutionary mechanisms do not bring about isolated, fully 
developed traits, but traits as the result of developmental processes. Realizable 
development is a precondition of evolution, at least of eukaryotes. Development 
makes organisms even susceptible to environmental influence on evolution, namely 
via environmentally induced modifications of developmental pathways (Gilbert 
2010), which is accounted for in the so-called extended synthetic theory of evolution 
(cf. Sultan 2015; Huneman & Walsh 2017).  
I do not want to propose that biomimetics should try to mimic this entanglement of 




evolution and development that might be worth mimicking in level three 
biomimetics. An example might be the development of bones. When a bone grows, 
its microstructure develops in direct response to the mechanical stress it is submitted 
to, in a way that allows for maximum stability with respect to the forces that are 
actually imposed on it, by minimal weight. This is mimicked in the construction of 
bone repair materials (Zhang et al. 2014; Chahal et al. 2019), in a field of 
biomimetics that has itself biological application.  
5. The mimetic asymmetry 
Having reconstructed in sec. 1 the biomimetic relation that holds between biological 
and technical systems as mediated by a model, it looks as if transfer could go both 
directions so that a biological – better to say: biotechnological – system designed by 
a technomimetic approach would be as easy to conceive as biomimetic classical 
technology. However, it needs to be taken into account that technical morphogenetic 
principles differ from biotic ones in several respects. Ontogenetic biological 
morphogenesis is based on developmental processes. The structures brought about by 
such process are constrained by the requirements that mechanisms are available that 
bring such a process about, that any intermediate state of the process is viable, and 
that the processes is robust. Technical construction, while not being restricted by 
developmental pathways, underlies its own constraints of technical feasibility, 
budgeting, etc. Phylogenetic morphogenesis in the realm of biology again underlies 
constraints resulting from path dependence and other historical contingencies, while 
analogous processes in technical development can easily bring together disparate 
paths. Also the stability requirements for the resulting structures are different in the 
biological and in the technical realm. 
Despite these differences, considerations about the symmetry of the transfer between 
biology and technology are at the basis of several projects in synthetic biology. 
Synthetic biology is a heterogeneous field, including top-down modification of 
existing organisms as well as bottom-up approaches to the de novo synthesis of new 
life forms from nonliving materials, and rational engineering as well as evolutionary 
approaches (Krohs & Bedau 2013). I shall be dealing only with rational engineering 
in the modification of existing organisms and focus on the approach that lead to the 
idea of programming cells by arranging bio-bricks, which are short pieces of DNA 
with particular functions, in a way similar to writing a computer program (Endy 
2005). The idea is to generate a particular behavior of the cell – be it a recurrent 
sequence of states, e.g., in an oscillator like a circadian clock, or an artificial 
biosynthetic pathway. This approach is often considered to be as appealing as its 




competition iGEM, which is based on it, succeeds for other reasons than for the 
development of stabile biotic machines (cf. Betten et al. 2018), and right so.  
The technomimetic aspect of this approach is quite clear, and stated explicitly by 
Endy and others. A flow chart is translated into a modular gene sequence in order to 
generate a simple gene regulatory network. The program is kept as linear as possible, 
following a strategy from modular programming in computer science. It links linear 
sequences with decision points, loops, and plugged-in subroutines. As in rational 
engineering, components are standardized, and modules as decoupled from each 
other as much as possible. However, it usually turns out that the result is unstable. 
Elements are expelled from the program, the chassis cell does not copy the program 
– the engineered DNA – as expected. How and why does this happen? The “how” is 
obvious: as always in genetic engineering, the engineered cells need to divide and 
multiply in order to generate a significant, even a measurable output. As soon as cell 
division comes into play, all kinds of modifications of the genetic material may 
happen, including loss of genetic material. Measures might be taken to minimize this, 
like coupling to antibiotic resistance genes, but in the end multiplication of 
engineered cells happens always in a way that allows for evolutionary change.  
The observation is thus that the genetic material of the engineered cells is 
evolutionary unstable, as it was already the case in the repressilator, a forerunner and 
still best-known example of this approach (Elowitz & Leibler 2000). Evolutionary 
instability corrupts the technomimetic bio-brick approach. But why is it so, despite 
the success of the rational engineering approach in many other fields of application? 
The answer I want to propose refers to the conditions for robustness of biological and 
of technological devices, respectively, as reconstructed in sec. 2. There, we have seen 
that robustness in biological systems is based in ongoing morphogenesis and in a 
deep entanglement of all processes: structures are not stabile, but permanently rebuilt 
and adjusted, by trial and error and/or by regulated replacement of all components, 
and processes are entangled by involving components that at also contribute to other 
processes. In technical systems, on the other hand, robustness is based in low rates of 
wear and tear, in decoupling and other mechanisms limiting the impact of errors, and 
in easy maintenance. Though there are certainly exceptions, robustness of biological 
systems lies in general in the interdependence of all their components, while 
robustness of technical systems is based in the separation of effects, even though 
functions are brought about only by coupling and interaction. We have messy, 
holistic interaction leading to robustness in biological systems, and sterile, analytic 




This observation suggests a plausible answer to the question why a rationally 
planned, modified organism lacks robustness: the implanted modules are not deeply 
embedded in the system of the organism, but added in a sterile way. But the modified 
organism cannot be maintained like a technical artifact, which would allow for 
robustness of such a delicate system with only few interconnections. It maintains 
itself – resulting in expelling every implant that is not deeply embedded in the 
functioning of the cell. Put in evolutionary terms: rationally planned top-down 
synthetic biology tries to get the implemented genetic programs selected, and the 
strategy is to couple them superficially to other genes that are under selection 
pressure. The setting selects for these other genes, and by coupling this results in 
selection of the implanted program. So far the rational. In reality, selection of (Sober 
1984) the implanted program is not sufficient, since the coupling to the genes 
selected for is easily dissolved in a few evolutionary steps. The technomimetic 
biological system is still a biological system and underlies biological – evolutionary 
– criteria of robustness. Seen this way, expelling the implanted material is a result of 
the robustness of the cell rather than an indicator of lacking robustness.  
This situation could, in principle, be solved by applying a biomimetic approach of 
the third level: by taking advantage of evolutionary and developmental mechanisms 
in stabilizing the genetically engineered system. This would require deeply 
embedding the added components rather than implanting them in a decoupled way. 
The goal would be that selection for these components occurs, e.g. because of their 
involvement in other than the constructed pathways, rather than mere selection of 
them. The components need to perform roles in fundamental processes within the 
cell. I do not dare speculating whether this is possible at all. Strategies would be 
required how such additional genes could be embedded deeply into metabolism. 
These strategies might best be copied from biological processes. They will almost 
certainly be far away from the present strategy of rational construction.  
The following picture for a biological cell with its gene regulatory network may 
illustrate my claim: Look at the cell and its metabolism as if it were a bowl filled 
with pebbles. The pebbles build up a fairly stabile structure since they are supporting 
each other and are put in form by the bowl. Implementing additional genes would be 
like adding marbles on top of the pebbles. This will work for a few added marbles, in 
particular if you arrange them in a single layer or in the shape of a pyramid. Now try 
to build a delicate sculpture, say with the proportions of a Giacometti, from the 
added marbles, with as few links to the pebbles as possible, which the aid of only 
some viscous grease. It is highly unlikely that your structure will survive for a longer 
time and remain intact when moving or shaking the bowl. A much better way to 




easy and you will not easily be able to see it any longer, but it is there and it is stable 
– stabilized by numerous interactions with the pebbles. If the delicate sculpture 
stands for the sophisticated program constructed out of bio-bricks, and moving and 
shaking of the bowl stands for selection pressure, this picture gives a pretty good 
understanding of the lack of robustness of the genetically engineered “machine” cell 
and for the problems stabilizing it – which hold on as long as the add-ons are not 
deeply embedded in the fundamental processes of the cell. 
We now can describe the biomimetic relation between biological and technical 
system more detailed than in sec. 1. Instead of the biological and the technical 
system being just two realizations of a model of the desired function, which lead to a 
symmetrical relation which turned out not to hold in the example from synthetic 
biology, the picture needs to account as well for robustness. A biomimetic device 
needs to be a robust implementation of the model, where robustness is to be achieved 
in the way adequate for the receiver system, not for the donor system. If the receiver 
system is a purely technical one, criteria for technical robustness hold. If it is a 
biological system, biological robustness needs to be implemented. This means that 
the mimetic relation is doomed to fail when robustness of the receiver system is 
constructed according to robustness mechanisms of the donor system. I have shown 
these for the technomimetic reconstruction of a biological system, but it will hold 
also in the other direction – which simply does not attract attention because it is 
observed routinely anyway: a biomimetic artifact needs to be robust in terms of 
artifact robustness rather than implementing biological robustness (however such 
implementation might be thought of). As long as deep embedding of new 
components in a biological organism is not possible, the mimetic relation is 
asymmetric and leads (almost) only from biological to technical systems, not the 
other way around. 
6. Conclusion 
Biomimetics is a relevant and very successful approach to implement technical 
functions. The reconstruction of the epistemology of biomimetics demonstrates that 
the approach is based on models of the function that link biological and technical 
system. On the fist glance, the relation between biological and technical system is 
therefore symmetrical. Since the strategies to make the systems robust differs 
between biology and technology, the transfer is limited by needs for robustness. In 
this regard, not the donor system, but the receiver system determines the criteria of a 
successful implementation of the function – which breaks the symmetry of the 
relation between donor system, model, and receiver system. This helps understanding 




transfer not only the implementation of the function from the technical to the 
biological realm, which nicely works, but also the means to achieve robustness, 
which failed. In a biological system, even if it is technomimetically re-engineered, 
robustness needs to be of the biological type.  
References: 
Arnold, Frances H. 2019. “Innovation by Evolution: Bringing New Chemistry to Life (Nobel 
Lecture).” Angewandte Chemie International Edition 58:14420–14426. 
Barthlott, Wilhelm, and Nesta Ehler. 1977. “Rasterelektronenmikroskopie der Epidermisoberflächen 
von Spermatophyten.” Pp. 367–467 in Tropische und subtropische Pflanzenwelt. Vol. 19. Mainz: 
Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag. 
Betten, Afke Wieke, Virgil Rerimassie, Jaqueline E.W. Broerse, Dirk Stemerding and Frank Kupper. 
2018. “Constructing future scenarios as a tool to foster responsible research and innovation 
among future synthetic biologists.” Life Sci Soc Policy 14:21. 
Bhushan, Bharat. 2009. “Biomimetics: Lessons from Nature – an Overview.” Philosophical 
Transactions of the Royal Society A 367:1445–1486.  
Bhushan, Bharat. 22016. “Gecko Effect.” Pp. 1319–1328 in Encyclopedia of Nanotechnology. Edited 
by Bharat Bhushan. Dordrecht: Springer. 
Borsari, Andrea. 2017. “Human Mimicry and Imitation: The Case of Biomimetics.” Aisthesis. 
Pratiche, Linguaggi E Saperi dell'estetico 10:51–61.  
Boxerbaum, Alexander S., Kendrick M. Shaw, Hillel J. Chiel, and Roger D. Quinn. 2012. 
“Continuous Wave Peristaltic Motion in a Robot.” The International Journal of Robotics 
Research 31:302–318. 
Braitenberg, Valentino. 1984. Vehicles: Experiments in synthetic psychology. Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Chahal, Sugandha, Anuj Kumar, and Fathima S. J. Hussian. 2019. “Development of Biomimetic 
Electrospun Polymeric Biomaterials for Bone Tissue Engineering. A Review.” Journal of 
Biomaterials Science, Polymer Edition 30:1308–1355. 
Chin, Diana D., and David Lentink. 2016. “Flapping Wing Aerodynamics: From Insects to 
Vertebrates.” The Journal of Experimental Biology 219:920–932. 
Dickinson, Michael H., and Florian T. Muijres. 2016. “The Aerodynamics and Control of Free Flight 
Manoeuvres in Drosophila.” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B 371:20150388. 
Elowitz, Michael B., and Stanislas Leibler. 2000. “A Synthetic Oscillatory Network of Transcriptional 
Regulators.” Nature 403:335–338. 
Endy, Drew. 2005. “Foundations for Engineering Biology.” Nature 438:449–453. 
Garson, Justin. 2016. A Critical Overview of Biological Functions. Dordrecht: Springer. 
Gilbert, Scott F. 92010. Developmental Biology. Sunderland: Sinauer Associates. 
Green, David W., Jolanta A. Watson, Han-Sung Jung, and Gregory S. Watson. 2019. “Natural History 
Collections as Inspiration for Technology.” BioEssays 41:1700238. 
Hammerstein, Peter, Edward H. Hagen, Andreas V. M. Herz, and Hanspeter Herzel. 2006. 
“Robustness: A Key to Evolutionary Design.” Biological Theory 1:90–93. 
Huneman, Philippe, and Denis M. Walsh (eds.). 2017. Challenging the Modern Synthesis: Adaptation, 
Development, and Inheritance. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Hülse, Martin, Steffen Wischmann, and Frank Pasemann. 2004. “Structure and Function of Evolved 
Neuro-Controllers for Autonomous Robots.” Connection Science 16:249–266.  
Kan, S. B. Jennifer, Russell D. Lewis, Kai Chen, and Frances H. Arnold. 2016. “Directed Evolution of 





Karásek, Matěj, Florian T. Muijres, Christophe De Wagter, Bart D. W. Remes, and Guido C. H. E. de 
Croon. 2018. “A Tailless Aerial Robotic Flapper Reveals that Flies Use Torque Coupling in 
Rapid Banked Turns.” Science 361:1089–1094. 
Krohs, Ulrich. 2008. “How Digital Computer Simulations Explain Real-World Processes.” 
International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 22:277–292. 
Krohs, Ulrich. 2009a. “Functions as Based on a Concept of General Design.” Synthese 166:69–89.  
Krohs, Ulrich. 2009b. “The Cost of Modularity.” Pp. 259–267 in Functions in Biological and 
Artificial Worlds: Comparative Philosophical Perspectives. Edited by Ulrich Krohs and Peter 
Kroes. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press. 
Krohs, Ulrich. 2021. “Evolution und Entwicklung – universelle Konzepte?” Pp. 77-90 in Biologische 
Transformation – Interdisziplinäre Grundlagen für die angewandte Forschung. Edited by Tomas 
Marzi, Hans-Werner Ingensiep and Heike Baranzke. Oberhausen: Laufen. 
Krohs, Ulrich, and Mark A. Bedau. 2013. “Interdisciplinary Interconnections in Synthetic Biology.” 
Biological Theory 8:313–317. 
Kroner, Elmar, and Eduard Arzt. 22016. “Gecko Adhesion.” Pp. 1308–1319 in Encyclopedia of 
Nanotechnology. Edited by Bharat Bhushan. Dordrecht: Springer. 
Letelier, Juan-Carlos, Jorge Soto-Andrade, Flavio Guíñez Abarzúa, Athel Cornish-Bowden, and 
María Luz Cárdenas. 2006. „Organizational Invariance and Metabolic Closure: Analysis in Terms 
of	(M,R) Systems.” Journal of Theoretical Biology 238:949–961.   
Maturana, Humberto R., and Francisco J. Varela. 21980. Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realization 
of the Living. Dordrecht: Reidel. 
McCaskill, John S. 2009. PACE Report: Programmable Artificial Cell Evolution. 
http://www.biomip.org/pacereport/the_pace_report/index.html 
Menciassi, Arianna, Samuele Gorini, Giuseppe Pernorio, Liu Weiting, Francesco Valvo, and Paolo 
Dario. 2004. “Design, Fabrication and Performances of a Biomimetic Robotic Earthworm.” Paper 
presented at the 2004 IEEE International Conference on Robotics and Biomimetics, August 22–
26.  
Morange, Michel. 2013. “Comparison Between the Work of Synthetic Biologists and the Action of 
Evolution: Engineering Versus Tinkering.” Biological Theory 8:318–323. 
Nachtigall, Werner. 2010. Bionik als Wissenschaft. Erkennen – Abstrahieren – Umsetzen. Berlin: 
Springer. 
Peacock, Mark S. (2009). “Path Dependence in the Production of Scientific Knowledge.” Social 
Epistemology 23:105-124. 
Perlman, Mark. 2004. “The Modern Philosophical Resurrection of Teleology.” The Monist 87:3–51. 
Pritchard, Duncan. 2005. Epistemic Luck. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Rechenberg, Ingo. 1973. Evolutionsstrategie – Optimierung technischer Systeme nach Prinzipien der 
biologischen Evolution. Stuttgart: Frommann Holzboog. 
Rosen, Robert. 1973. “On the Dynamical Realization of (M, R)-Systems.” Bulletin of Mathematical 
Biology 35:1–9. 
Rosen, Robert. 1991. Life Itself: A Comprehensive Inquiry Into the Nature, Origin, and Fabrication of 
Life. New York: Columbia University Press.   
Sarikaya, Mehmet, and Ilhan A. Aksay (eds.). 1995. Biomimetics: Design and Processing of Materials. 
Woodbury: AIP Press. 
Schwefel, Hans-Paul. 1968. “Experimentelle Optimierung einer Zweiphasendüse.” Report HE/F 35-B 
from AEG Forschungsinstitut Berlin. 
Shyy, Wei, Chang-kwon Kang, Pakpong Chirarattananon, Sridhar Ravi, and Hao Liu. 2016. 
“Aerodynamics, Sensing and Control of Insect-Scale Flapping-Wing Flight.” Proceedings of the 




Sober, Elliott. 1984. The Nature of Selection: Evolutionary Theory in Philosophical Focus. 
Cambridge, Mass: Bradford/MIT Press. 
Solga, Andreas, Zdenek Cerman, Boris F. Striffler, Manuel Spaeth, and Wilhelm Barthlott. 2007. 
“The Dream of Staying Clean: Lotus and Biomimetic Surfaces.” Bioinspiration & Biomimetics 
2:126–134. 
Sultan, Sonia E. 2015. Organism and Environment: Ecological Development, Niche Construction, 
and Adaptation. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Vincent, Julian F. V., Olga A. Bogatyreva, Nikolaj R. Bogatyrev, Adrian Bowyer, and Anja-Karina 
Pahl. 2006. “Biomimetics: Its Practice and Theory.” Journal of the Royal Society Interface 3:471–
482.  
Wouters, Arno G. 2003. “Four Notions of Biological Function.” Studies in History and Philosophy of 
Biology and Biomedical Science 34:633–668.  
Zhang, Xuesong, Ming Lu, Yan Wang, Xiaojing Su, and Xuelian Zhang. 2014. “The Development of 
Biomimetic Spherical Hydroxyapatite/Polyamide 66 Biocomposites as Bone Repair Materials.” 
International Journal of Polymer Science 2014:579252. 
